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SafetyPhotovoltaic systems have played a key role over the last decade in the evolution of the
electricity sector. In terms of safety design, it’s important to consider that a PV plant con-
stitutes a special system of generation, where the Direct Current (DC) presence results in
changes to the technical rules. Moreover, if certain electrical faults occur, the plant is a pos-
sible source of ﬁre. Choices regarding the grounding of the generator and its protection
devices are fundamental for a design that evaluates ﬁre risk. The subject of the article is
the analysis of the relation between electrical phenomena in PV systems and the ﬁre risk
related to ensuring appropriate fault detection by the electrical protection system. A
description of a grid-connected PV system is followed ﬁrstly by a comparison of the design
solutions provided by International Standards, and secondly by an analysis of electrical
phenomena which may trigger a ﬁre. A study of two existing PV systems, where electrical
faults have resulted in ﬁres, is then presented. The study highlights the importance of
checking all possible failure modes in a PV system design phase, to assess ﬁre risk in
advance. Some guidelines for the mitigation of electrical faults that may result in a ﬁre
are ﬁnally provided.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
The energy generated by photovoltaic (PV) systems have played a key role over the last decade in the evolution of the
electricity sector, offering a unique opportunity for the growth of mixed production of electricity on a large scale [1–3].
The energy produced by PV systems in Europe, which currently amounts to 4% of peak demand on the continent (with
51 GW installed), could reach a maximum of 25% of European demand in 2030, contributing greatly to the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions and decreasing use of fossil fuels [4,5]. The need for speciﬁc Standards to provide clear and prac-
tical guidelines for the design of safety in a PV system, and to regulate the connection to the public network became
mandatory.
Concerning the design of safety, it’s particularly important to take into account that a PV plant constitutes a special sys-
tem of generation in which the presence of Direct Current (DC) results in changes in the application of general technical
rules, and the system itself is a possible source of ﬁre should certain electrical faults occur. Choices regarding the layoutovoltaic;
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of a system that accounts for the risk of ﬁre.
The speciﬁcation for the safe design of a PV system is currently deﬁned by International Standards: NEC 2011 and UL1741
for the countries of North America [6,7]; IEC 60364-7 and IEC 62257-7 for the countries of the European Community [8,9]. To
date, the questions relating to the start of a ﬁre in case of electrical failures in PV systems have been solved according to the
type of system and through the study of real cases, although some Standards do not refer to the problems, while others have
not been updated in relation to the use of the newest protective equipment. The problem of ﬁre in PV systems for electrical
faults is therefore still open and worthy of attention.
The subject of this article is the analysis of the relationship between electrical phenomena, that can occur inside of a PV
system, and the related means of protection (depending on the system architecture), that can determine the occurrence and
development of a ﬁre. For this purpose, in Section ‘‘Grid-connected PV systems’’, a brief description of the elements of a typ-
ical grid-connected PV system is followed by a detailed analysis of the design solutions provided by different International
Standards and a comparison of the safety performance of these solutions. In Section ‘‘PV power plant: ﬁre risk and safety
issues’’ the authors report on electrical phenomena which may trigger a ﬁre in an electrical system, and set these phenomena
in the context of a speciﬁc case of a PV plant. Section ‘‘Two case studies: ﬁre risk from electrical faults in grounded PV plants’’
includes the analysis of two case studies of existing PV systems, in which there has been an electrical fault resulting in the
development of a ﬁre: this analysis highlights the importance of checking all possible failure modes in a PV system in the
design phase, in order to assess the risk of ﬁre in advance. Section ‘‘Conclusions’’ summarizes the conclusions and provides
some guidelines for the mitigation of the problems associated with speciﬁc electrical faults that may result in a ﬁre.Grid-connected PV systems
PV systems are distinguished in terms of their working conditions in relation to the grid in stand-alone and grid-con-
nected PV systems. The ﬁrst systems are not the objective of this paper and so they are not here described. The second sys-
tems are the objective of the analysis and so a description of their main components and layout is provided.
The grid-connected PV systems are connected to large independent grids (typically public) and can feed power either
directly into a residential or commercial building or back into the grid. Its main components in the DC side and the AC side
are represented in Figs. 1 and 2. They are: PV generator, consisting of panels connected together in series/parallel conﬁgu-
ration to form strings, that can constitute either one array or multiple sub-arrays; inverter, equipped or unequipped with a
high or low frequency transformer; possible storage system (typically electrochemical, as batteries); grounding system;
devices protecting against over-current in the DC and AC side; Surge Protection Devices (SPD); interface system to the grid.
A PV system can include one or more generators, according to the power produced.Fig. 1. Typical PV system layout with one array.
Fig. 2. Typical PV system layout with more sub-arrays.
Fig. 3. PV string cable short circuit (single-line representation).
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multiple arrays (sub-arrays), as shown in Fig. 4, each of which is composed of a series of strings in parallel connected to the
junction box of the PV generator.
If designed in accordance with technical Standards, a PV system cannot be subject to overload; consequently it doesn’t
need a protection device for this purpose. The cables of the PV system can however, be affected by a short circuit current
in the event of: fault between the two poles of the DC system; ground-fault in systems with a grounded point; double
ground-fault in isolated systems. The main difference between a normal plant powered by the network, and a PV system
resides in the fact that a PV system is a generator. As a result, as shown in Fig. 3, in the presence of a short circuit on a string
cable, the fault is fed from one side by the string affected by the failure, and from the other by the current generated by all
the other strings in parallel (reverse current). This fault current ﬂows to the path characterized by lower impedance, which in
this case coincides with the string affected by the short circuit. The result is that, in the event of a short circuit, a string cable
can be subjected to a current equal to the current of the generator, making the protection of strings being needed, unless it is
not sized to withstand the reverse current.
The same phenomenon occurs if the fault is localized in a subarray cable, as shown in Fig. 4. Also, in this case, if the cable
in question is not sized for the current of the generator, it is necessary to install a protection device in the main DC junction
box. Given the small short circuit currents, to protect the system from short circuits, it is common to use fuses or circuit
breakers with small rated currents (when necessary). The inverter is located downstream of the main junction box, that con-
tains the protective devices of the PV ﬁeld. It may be single-phase or three-phase with respect to the power plant. Single-
phase systems are common with power up to 10 kW, while with hundreds of kW three-phase systems are generally used.
The presence of one or more inverters in a PV system depends on the power plant. Typically, for PV generator power up to
6 kW, modules are divided into one or two strings which feed a single-phase inverter, while for higher powers and three-
phase loads it is possible to evaluate whether to install one three-phase inverter, or multiple single-phase inverters. Very
frequently the inverter can also be integrated with a transformer, which performs two main functions: to adjust the voltage
level of the primary circuit of the system to the network and to provide an inherent protection against the closing of DC cur-
rent through the network. The inverter is always equipped with a device, for the protection of the PV system from the effects
of surges that is called a Surge Protection Device (SPD). PV systems, typically located outside of buildings and often on theirFig. 4. PV sub-array cable short circuit (single-line representation).
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protect the PV system from indirect lightning strikes, which can create surges in electrical circuits mainly through inductive
coupling. In particular, the DC wiring that connects the PV modules typically has the form of a closed loop that often causes
inductive couplings with the electromagnetic ﬁelds generated by lightning. Depending on the exposure of the circuits, it may
be necessary to supply the strings with SPDs.
A PV generator, similarly to any electrical system, must be provided with a grounding system coordinated with appropri-
ate safety devices for protection against indirect contact in the case of Class I equipment. The layout of the grounding system
varies depending on the type of plant, which can be:
– with the generator negative pole grounded at the inverter; the equipment grounding conductor of DC Class I equipment is
connected to the grounded conductor of the generator (commonly used in North America);
– with the generator isolated from the ground: the equipment grounding conductor of the Class I equipment of the DC side
is connected to the same grounding terminal used for the AC (mainly used in Europe).
In order to connect a PV system to the grid, a set of devices of protection are provided to perform the appropriate func-
tions to prevent the PV generator feeds the network in case of abnormal values of voltage and frequency. In general, the
choice of the components of the interface depends greatly on the layout used (grounded system or isolated system): the phe-
nomena that can occur in the event of a fault in relation to the layout are diversiﬁed by imposing a correct management of
the fault, such as to coordinate the use of certain protection devices with the related system.
Layout options
A PV system can be designed, in relation to the grounding of the generator and the transformer presence, as: an
ungrounded with transformer, an ungrounded without transformer and a grounded PV system.
Ungrounded PV systems with transformer
Fig. 5a and b shows an ungrounded PV system with a transformer, typically used in Europe and deﬁned by [9]. The main
feature of its layout resides in the fact that the presence of a ground-fault in the DC side involves no ﬂowing of the current on
the network, thanks to the presence of the transformer. This transformer determines the galvanic separation between the
generator and the network itself. If all system components are provided with double insulation, as shown in Fig. 5a, the sys-
tem is intrinsically safe, and does not require the use of any grounding system. The situation is different in the presence of
Class I equipment (simple insulation). In this case, a ground-fault determines the ﬂowing of a small ground-fault current on
the DC side, due to the leakage capacitance of the PV generator, as shown in Fig. 5b [8]. In order to increase the level of safety
and to decrease the likelihood of ground-faults, IEC 62257-7 Standard [9] (and successively the draft version of the AS/
NZS5033 Standard [9]) recommends using components in Class II (double insulation) wherever possible.
The occurrence of a ground-fault, both in the presence of Class I and Class II equipment is monitored by an Insulation
Monitoring Device (IMD), supplied with the isolated inverter, by most of the manufacturers. The only technical Standards
to explicitly recommend the use of an IMD in a PV system are the AS/NZS 5033 and the UL1741, both of which are currently
in phases of review. The scientiﬁc publications [10,12,13] also stress the importance of using an IMD: this device warns of the
occurrence of a ﬁrst ground-fault, allowing its rapid detection and the automatic disconnection of supply to the network. The
IMD device, as shown in Fig. 5a and b, is inserted between one pole of the system and the ground and presents the charac-
teristics contained in the technical standard IEC 61557-8 [14]. The IMD sends a signal to a shutdown system, when the resis-
tance of the plant decays below a speciﬁc value (Ran), which in turn must be chosen in relation to the minimum value of the
insulation resistance of the PV generator (RISO MIN), under the worst weather conditions. In order to avoid trouble trips, the
value of the rated insulation resistance Ran for an IMD device must be chosen according to the following relation [12]:1:5Ran  RISO MIN ð1ÞFig. 5. Ungrounded PV system with transformer and Class II (a) or Class I (b) equipment.
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tem power.Ungrounded PV systems without transformer
In case of absence of a transformer, the ungrounded PV system is an extension of the network and is grounded via the
network itself. As shown in Fig. 8, all Class I equipment must be connected to ground, and the safety of the system depends
upon the automatic disconnection of the supply. In case of a DC ground-fault, the current ﬂows through the grounding elec-
trode system and the network. It is worth that, following a ground-fault, the supply must be disconnected in the manner and
time prescribed by technical Standards [5,6]. Fig. 6 shows how a ground-fault in the DC side determines the tripping of the
residual current device installed downstream of the inverter (sensitive to both AC and DC): this device is recommended for
ungrounded PV systems without transformer by international technical Standards IEC 60364-7 [5] and AS/NZS 5033 [9]
(Fig. 7).Grounded PV systems
If the PV system is grounded, all the Class I equipment (apparatus with simple insulation) are connected to the grounded
point of the generator. In this case, the PV generator can be connected to ground only in the presence of a transformer, which
ensures the galvanic isolation, thus preventing the ﬂow of the DC residual current on the AC side. In these systems a ﬁrst
ground-fault can be likened to a short circuit, characterized by a certain reverse current dependent on the point of failure,
the number of strings and the number of sub-arrays. The situation that occurs in the event of a ground-fault on an
ungrounded string cable and on an ungrounded sub-array cable is shown respectively in Fig. 9a and b, where the contribu-
tions of current produced by all the strings in parallel make their way to the fault, as this is the path of least resistance.
A fuse on the grounded pole performs the function of the protective device against ground-faults, known as Ground-fault
Protection Device (GFPD) in American legislation. The National Electrical Code (NEC) explicitly states that this type of pro-
tection is only intended to guard the installation from the onset of a ﬁre [15]. In order to avoid nuisance tripping, the rated
current of the GFPD device must always be greater than the value of the maximum leakage current to ground. The higher the
voltage and the extension of the plant, the greater the leakage currents are under the worst conditions. These currents
reclose by means of the grounded pole, affecting the GFPD device. The maximum rated current of the GFPD device, integrated
in the inverter to the output of the system, is established by the UL 1741 standard: for a rated DC power of 100–250 kW, a
GFPD rated current of 4 A is imposed; for a rated DC power superior to 250 kW a GFPD rated current of 5 A is imposed.
A similar protective device has been introduced in the standard AS/NZS 5033, which speciﬁes that the Ground-fault Pro-
tection Device must have a minimum rated current such as to meet the requirements contained in the UL 1741 standard
[11]. Fig. 8a and b illustrate in details the different current path in case of ground-fault, on the grounded conductor and
on the ungrounded conductor respectively. Red lines show the points of passage of the ground-fault current. In Fig. 10b
the ground-fault current has a large value given by the whole short circuit current of the generator, while in Fig. 8a it can
be characterized by low values generally insufﬁcient to blow the GFPD device. Although the value of the ground-fault current
displayed in Fig. 8a depends on the point and the impedance of the fault, it also depends on both the sections of the string
equipment grounding conductor and the string conductor. As shown in Fig. 9, if a ﬁrst ground-fault on the grounded con-
ductor stays undetected, a second ground-fault on the ungrounded conductor can occur independently from the ﬁrst fault.Fig. 6. Use of a RCM in an ungrounded PV system without transformer.
Fig. 7. Layout of a grounded PV system: current path in case of fault on a string (a) or a sub-array (b) conductor.
Fig. 8. Current path in a grounded conductor fault for a grounded PV system (a) for a grounded PV system (b).
Fig. 9. Double ground-fault in a grounded PV system.
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tions between electrical cables and electrical terminal strips, that may cause either the lowering of the insulation layer or the
heating of the insulation layer of the cable. In this case the blowing of the GFPD doesn’t avoid the ﬂowing of the fault current
which closes through the two points of fault. Fig. 12 illustrates the main differences between the layout of the three systems,
in terms of ground-faults and protection devices.
Fig. 10. Main differences between different PV layouts.
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Recent research studies and scientiﬁc discussions have contributed to contemporary analysis of ﬁre risk and safety issues
in PV systems, resulting in heightened safety in the PV industry. Wide-ranging concerns have been investigated to support
the introduction of certain regulations in standardization groups, enabling ﬁre ﬁghters, building authorities and manufactur-
ers of photovoltaic products to signiﬁcantly reduce the risk of ﬁre in PV systems [16–32].
In general two substantial causes can trigger a ﬁre in a PV system: the spread of a ﬁre either inside or on the outside of a
building; an inner ﬁre resulting from a malfunction within the module or related electrical components (boxes, cables, con-
nectors, DC distribution boxes and inverters). In this paper, ﬁres caused by a malfunction within PV speciﬁc electrical com-
ponents are analyzed. In a PV plant, as well as in all electrical system, a ﬁre can be caused by the presence of short circuits
(current with a high value), arcs (current with a low value, generally associated with ground-faults) and poor connections, all
three of which may lead to an over-heating of cables and other electrical components [24–32].
The prevention of a ﬁre caused by electrical components in a PV plant is related to the material used to produce modules
and electrical components, as well as the plant’s design, its installation and its maintenance. Both the proper sizing of the
electrical components, in the project stage, and the use of appropriate installation techniques, with high attention to wire
management, are fundamental to the reduction of risk. In particular, performing periodic maintenance to identify and
resolve any system damage (such as thermal and mechanical stress) is essential, as well as using a data acquisition system
to determine if unscheduled maintenance is required.
The development of an electrical fault into a ﬁre in a PV system is closely connected to the layout of the system and the
right use of speciﬁc protection devices related to each of the system’s components (such as string and sub-array cables,
inverter, transformer), as explained in Section ‘‘Introduction’’. Depending on the system layout, there can be speciﬁc condi-
tions where the Ground-fault Protection Device is not able to detect the ground-fault current, even if chosen according to
technical Standards. This event speciﬁcally occurs when the ground-fault current has a value lower than the rated value
Fig. 11. Possible consequences of the phenomenon of the blind spot.
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deﬁned as having a blind spot.
Recent studies have highlighted that the blind spot phenomenon is more common in grounded PV systems than in
ungrounded ones. Depending on the transformer presence in the ungrounded systems, it is common to protect against
ground-faults by installing: an Insulation Monitoring Device (IMD) that detects ground-fault currents and monitors the
occurrence of any insulation faults, or a Residual Current Detector (RCD). In the case of the grounded systems, the usual pro-
tection device suggested by all the Standards is a Ground-fault Protection Device (GFPD) located on the grounded conductor.
This device is only able to detect ground-faults on the ungrounded conductor. So in the case of a primary ground-fault on the
grounded conductor, the fault stays undetected indeﬁnitely until a secondary fault takes place on one of the ungrounded
conductors. As shown in Fig. 11, in the event of this second fault, a short circuit is set up and the GFPD is no longer able
to interrupt the fault current, as better explained in the following Section referring to a real case: depending on the second
fault point (string, array or sub-array), the short circuit current, occurring after a second ground-fault, may exceed the string
conductors ampacity, with the result of a ﬁre.
In the presence of metallic raceways (connected to the grounding system through the equipment grounding conductor),
the formation of an electric arc between the faulted conductor and the metallic raceways is possible, should the fault consist
of damage to the ungrounded conductor insulation.
In the next Section, two cases of ﬁres within PV systems, located in the USA, are analyzed in order to examine the occur-
rence of blind spots in grounded PV systems:
(1) The ﬁrst case (Case A: Bakersﬁeld Fire, California) refers to a ﬁre derived from a primary undetected ground-fault on a
string grounded conductor, and a secondary ground-fault on a sub-array ungrounded conductor.
(2) The second case (Case B: Mount Holly Fire, North Carolina) refers to a ﬁre derived from two ground-faults that
occurred respectively on a sub-array grounded conductor (primary fault) and a sub-array ungrounded conductor (sec-
ondary fault).
Both cases guided the American PV industry to a major awareness of larger safety concerns derived from the practice of
grounding the PV array.Two case studies: Fire risk from electrical faults in grounded PV plants
Two real case studies have been analyzed, with the objectives: to improve an understanding of the complex nature of
faults that can trigger a ﬁre in PV systems; to explore the safety implications of suspected inadequate ground-fault-protec-
tion. The 2009 Bakersﬁeld ﬁre in California and the 2011 Mount Holly Fire in North Carolina are the only two publicized ﬁres
from a multitude of accidents in U.S. PV plants, where most of the plants are grounded, as suggested by the American NEC
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key factors that contributed to the ﬁres.
Case study A: Bakersﬁeld Fire, California
On April 2009 in Bakersﬁeld (California, USA), a PV plant caught ﬁre on the roof of a big box store. The system consists of:
7 sub-arrays, each composed of 22 parallel strings, with a maximum current of 159 A per sub-array; a 5 A fuse, installed on
the grounded conductor, used as GFPD; 5 A fuses installed on the string ungrounded conductors to provide short circuit pro-
tection; 300 A fuses installed on the sub-array ungrounded conductors to provide short circuit protection; string conductors
and string equipment grounding conductors with a section of 10 American Wire Gauge (AWG), that corresponds to a Euro-
pean section of about 6 mm2, and with an ampacity of 40 A; sub-array conductors and sub-array equipment grounding con-
ductor with a section of 750 AWG, which corresponds to a European section of 380 mm2, and with an ampacity of 535 A5.
Both string conductors and equipment grounding conductors were placed in metallic raceways, while sub-array conduc-
tors and related equipment grounding conductors were placed in metallic pipes. All the metallic raceways and all the pipes
were connected to the grounding system. Ofﬁcial reports on the ﬁre event [19,20] write that two electric arcs occurred in two
different points of the system: the ﬁrst arc took place along one of the metallic raceways connecting the strings with the CB7
junction box, as shown in Fig. 12; the second one took place on a metallic pipe joint, connecting the CB7 junction box with
the related inverter, as shown in Fig. 13.
The hypothesis is that both the arcs, derived respectively from the damage of a string cable and a sub-array cable, were
originally caused by badly assembled conduits. The movement of the ducts coupling under thermal expansion damaged the
cables. The drop of the cables insulation voltage at the damaged point (with a system voltage of 500 V) determined dis-
charges between the conductors, and between the conductors and the metallic conduits.
It appears that the root cause of the Bakersﬁeld ﬁre can be found in a ﬁrst undetected ground-fault on a string grounded
conductor. In this case, the ground-fault current splits between the ungrounded conductor and the equipment grounding
conductor. If the string equipment grounding conductor section is equal to the string conductor section, the fault current
has a maximum value of half the string’s current (with a zero fault resistance in the worst conditions). So if the string’s cur-
rent has a maximum value of 8 A, the fault current is between 3 and 4 A, too low to blow a 5 A fuse. In this undetected con-
dition, a ground-fault on the string grounded conductor may exist indeﬁnitely, establishing a new ‘‘normal’’ condition that
makes the GFPD unable to clear a second ground-fault.Fig. 12. First ground-fault of the Bakersﬁeld ﬁre.
Fig. 13. Second ground-fault in the Bakersﬁeld ﬁre.
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sub-arrays ﬂows towards the two faults. This situation induces two electric arcs in correspondence with the two fault points,
and a current of about 1000 A which ﬂows through the metallic raceways and pipes, the equipment grounding conductor
and the string conductor. The GFPD blows without interrupting the fault current, as shown in Fig. 13. So a current of about
1000 A ﬂows through both a string grounded conductor and an equipment grounding conductor of 10 AWGwithout blowing
the protection device. This condition determines the burning of the wire’s insulation.
Because NEC installation requirements do not allow overcurrent protection devices in the grounded conductors of
grounded PV arrays, full array current ﬂows unconstrained through the ground-fault in the string-level wires of the system.
Fig. 14 demonstrates how the blowing of the 300 A fuse, with a current of 950 A, happens in about 60 s. This time is not suf-
ﬁcient to avoid damage to the insulation of the string conductor of 10 AWG. The heat developed for Joule effect by the fault
current burned the insulation layer and appeared to start a ﬁre that spread all along the raceways, determining multiple
faults.
In Fig. 15 the speciﬁc energy let-through curve of a 300 A fuse and the thermal withstand capacity of a 10 AGW cable
isolated with EPR are compared: for tripping times higher than 100, and a current of about 1000 A, the speciﬁc energy let
through by a 300 A fuse (207 A2/s) is higher than the thermal withstand capacity of a 10 AWG conductor (106 A2/s). This con-
dition is a cause of ﬁre.Case B: Mount Holly Fire, North Carolina
The second well-known ﬁre in the USA involving a PV system happened in Mount Holly, North Carolina, in April 2011. The
DC system architecture referred to in Case A, is used again, in order to analyze the causes of this ﬁre. The protection devices
and the components are the same (Fig. 16).
The ofﬁcial report on the ﬁre event [21] in this case revealed that the ﬁre appeared to have been caused by two electric
arcs, occurring respectively in a grounded sub-array cable and an ungrounded sub-array cable. Fig. 17 shows the current path
in the ﬁrst ground-fault, caused by damage to the insulation of the grounded sub-array conductor: the ground-fault in the
grounded sub-array conductor causes the current to split and follow two parallel paths from the inverter to the fault point.
Even if the sub-array conductor and the equipment grounding conductor have the same section, the fault current might still
possess insufﬁcient values to blow the GFPD, depending on the value of the fault resistance.
As in Case A, the ﬁrst fault on the grounded sub-array conductor remains undetected indeﬁnitely, until a second fault
occurred. In the event of a second ground-fault on the sub-array ungrounded conductor, the result is a short circuit unable
Fig. 14. 300 A fuse time–current characteristic diagram.
Fig. 15. 300 A fuse and 6 mm2 wire let-through curves.
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Fig. 16. First ground-fault in the Mount Holly Fire.
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started solely from the electric arcs that originated in the fault points (between the damaged conductors and the metallic
conduits).
By examining a typical PV solar wire used in the USA, it was possible to demonstrate that the root cause of the ﬁre in Case
B appeared to have been only the result of the electric arcs: this cable, which ﬁts the installation in a metallic tube, is chosen
with an ampacity greater than the fuse rated current, and with a value greater than or equal to 1.56 of the a sub-array short
circuit current (Isc_subarray). Considering a sub-array short circuit current of 162 A, the ampacity value found is reduced due to
the temperature coefﬁcient in the NEC standard. The reduction of the ampacity with ambient temperatures greater than
60 C determines the selection of an AWG-750 wire, corresponding to a European section of 380 mm2. An alternative can
be to install two AWG-290 conductors in parallel, each supplying 50% of the operating sub-array current. Comparing the
let-through curve of a 300 A fuse (in correspondence to the PV array short circuit current of about 1000 A) with a
120 mm2 cable thermal withstand capacity, it is possible to deduce that both a 380 mm2 section and a 127 mm2 section
are widely protected against the insulation deterioration, as a result of the temperature developed by the Joule effect, con-
sidering the value of the current ﬂowing respectively in the two sections (Fig. 18).
Discussion: Fire mitigation strategies and equipment recommendations to prevent blind spot in grounded PV systems
In both of the real case studies, our analysis points out that the ﬁre may have been caused by a blind spot in the 4–5 A fuse
used as ground-fault protection, as stipulated by the UL1741 standard.
The use of 4–5 A fuses to protect systems from ground-faults is justiﬁed by the high value of the leakage current. Fuses
with a high value of rating currents are in fact able to avoid trouble tripping, but are inadequate to interrupt the small fault
currents derived from a ﬁrst fault on the grounded conductor. The value of this fault current depends upon the fault point,
the section of the conductors and the fault resistance.
At present, the most reliable solution to prevent blind spots in grounded PV systems is to install multiple small inverters
and combine two devices: an IMD device to monitor the insulation resistance of the system [21]; a RCM device sensitive to
DC [10,21,22]. Installing multiple small inverters means splitting the total number of PV arrays among more inverters of
smaller nominal power. This involves in a smaller leakage capacitive current in the GFPD of each inverter, and so in a smaller
size of the device and a better sensitivity resulting in a better detection of ground faults.
Fig. 17. Second ground-fault in the Mount Holly Fire.
Fig. 18. Positioning of the RCM device in a PV array.
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sitive to DC is the safest way to prevent ﬁre risks caused by ground faults, because a ground fault is originated by a damage in
the insulation between active electrical components. Installing an IMD device allows the measurement of the resistance
between a point and the ground, and then to detect a damage in the insulation of the system. The RCM can instead detect
by electronic components the DC fault, performing the measurement of the direct differential current between more conduc-
tors that passes through the device, or the direct measurement of a DC current ﬂowing through one of the conductors. So,
although the Standards still do not clearly require the use of a RCM to protect grounded PV arrays, it is currently the only
device able to detect both DC leakage fault current and DC ground-fault current.
The key characteristic of an RMC, deﬁned in the IEC 62020 [22], is to have a high sensitivity to small values of DC currents.
In order to detect faults, it is installed either on the grounded conductor (within the inverter) or directly on the carrying con-
ductors, with different degrees of sensitivity depending on the point of installation. When choosing the RCM rated residual
operating current (IDn), the maximum leakage current (ILEAK MAX) under the worse meteorological conditions must be taken
into account. To prevent nuisance tripping, considering that the trip range should be between 0.5 and 2 IDn, the following
relation must be veriﬁed [7]:0:5IDn  ILEAK MAX ð2Þ
Usually to provide the protection against direct and indirect contact, the rated residual operating current IDn is chosen
with a value of 135 mA according to the IEC/TS 60479 [32].Conclusions
A PV plant is a special generation system in which the presence of DC results in changes to the application of general tech-
nical rules. Moreover, if certain electrical faults occur, the system itself can become a possible source of ﬁre. The layout of the
system, the grounding of the negative pole of the DC side and the means of protection are all vital concerns affecting the
design of a system that accounts for the risk of ﬁre.
In this paper, the design solutions provided by different International Standards have been studied and their safety per-
formances compared. The effect of electrical faults in PV systems is signiﬁcantly governed by these standards and an analysis
of the relation between the faults and the related means of protection has been presented.
The focus has then on two case studies of existing grounded PV systems in the USA, in which electrical faults have
resulted in the development of ﬁres. In both case studies, the analysis suggests that the ﬁre was caused by a blind spot in
the protection device used as ground-fault protection. This evidence emphasizes the importance of checking all possible fail-
ure modes in a PV system in its design phase, in order to prevent ﬁre due to blind spots.
The most reliable solution for the avoidance of blind spots is to install multiple small inverters and to combine two
devices: an IMD device to monitor the insulation resistance of the system, and a RCM device sensitive to DC Although the
Standards still do not clearly require the use of a RCM to protect grounded PV arrays, it is currently the only device able
to detect small DC ground-fault currents.
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